The disease of insidious onset presents special problems for the lawyer concerned in a claim for compensation. These difficulties stem from the long-established basis for civil liability in our law, namely, fault. The idea that no one should be liable to pay damages without fault on his part has shaped a large part of our system of law. It is an idea, however, which has been increasingly eroded in this century not only here but to a greater extent in the United States and on the Continent. Experiences with the escape of nuclear radiation and with adverse drug reactions, and interactions, have done much to hasten the process.
It still remains, however, the guiding principle of the great majority of claims for damages in our Courts that the claimant must show fault on the part of the person he sues. This involves the claimant in proof of three elements: (1) that the person sued (henceforward 'the defendant') owed the claimant a duty to take care for the claimant's safety; (2) that the defendant was in breach of that duty (the essential 'fault'); and (3) that the claimant's damage resulted from that breach. Each of these elements is of equal importance to the claimant's success. Failure to establish anyone results in failure of the claim. It will be helpful to consider each element in turn and, for present purposes, in the context of a case of abestosis or mesothelioma.
Duty ofcare
It may be taken as an absolute rule that employers owe their employees a duty to take reasonable care for their safety. This involves, however, knowledge of potential sources of injury, because it is not reasonable or practicable to guard against unknown dangers. As with countless other toxic substances in industry, awareness of the danger of asbestos has been a progressive process rather than an instantaneous and full insight into the problem. In particular the degree of exposure necessary to induce disease has been ascertained only by a laborious and empirical process of progressively reducing the exposure and awaiting the results, necessarily delayed by the length of the induction period for the disease. Thus employers who thought that their precautions were sufficient at one time have later discovered 0141-0768/78/120922-04/$01.00/0 () 1978 The Royal Society or Medicine that something much better needed to be done. It follows that to fix the standard ofduty on the employer it may be necessary to examine the state of medical and scientific knowledge at some vaguely identified moment in the past when the first radiologically invisible and symptomless damage was done. This is usually a most difficult exercise. Centuries ago we used to have trial by ordeal and trial by combat, in which whoever survived the greatest battering was declared the winner. Nowadays we commonly have trial by bombardment with learned papers.
Thus it has only been by the passage of time that we have learned that the manufacturer's duty may extend beyond the ambit of persons employed in the process to persons outside. The striking discovery of the association of asbestos-induced disease with wives who have handled workmen's clothes contaminated with asbestos is an example. And ifit is correct that relatively small exposures to asbestos may induce mesothelioma in the susceptible, it will not be enough to exhaust asbestos dust from machinery only to eject it into the atmosphere outside the factory for others to breathe. So the ambit of the duty may itself be expanding and is difficult to circumscribe at any given moment. As knowledge increases, so does the scope of the duty.
Breach ofduty
Once the Court has established a relevant standard of care at the material time, it must turn to measure the defendant's performance to see ifhe has fallen short of the standard and is thus in breach of duty. Not even this is easy. Exhaust appliances, masks and protective clothing are constantly under development. Precautions may lapse for periods and then be brought up to standard again. However, this phase of establishing liability is less specifically dependent upon medical science than the last and undoubtedly worst problem, that of 'causation', to use the lawyer'sjargon for the identification of two events as cause and effect.
The damage must be the result of the breach This, the aetiological factor, troubles the lawyer most. It has never been considered just to make even the most neglectful person pay for damage which does not flow pretty directly from his conduct. As in the case of the other two elements which have to be proved, the standard of proof of causation is no more than 'the balance of probabilities'. On the face of it, such a standard of proof would seem easy to satisfy, but in practice the determination of even a probable connection between cause and effect is often difficult in the field of the pneumoconiosis.
Where the history discloses substantial exposure to asbestos dust and a biopsy shows the presence of an abnormal number of asbestos bodies, the probable connection between the exposure and the subsequent condition of the lungs called asbestosis may easily be established. But many cases are nothing like so clear-cut.
If I have correctly understood my instructions in the past, there is an association between mesothelioma and quite small exposures to asbestos dust. Added to this, it is a fact that the lungs of most ordinarily healthy people would be found on examination to contain a number of asbestos bodies, especially if they had lived in industrial areas. If one finally remembers that there is an apparently unattributable incidence of mesothelioma in the general population, the problem for the Court becomes obvious. In such a situation, to decide what is even probable about the aetiology is difficult.
But the position becomes far worse if one adds cancer of the lung to the picture in a claimant who has had substantial exposure to asbestos dust and is or has been a heavy smoker. Not only is the Court faced with a choice of alternative causes ofequal probability but there is the subtler contribution of the synergistic effect of smoking. How far ought the negligent employer to be responsible for injuries which have been aggravated by smoking?
To these and many other kindred problems the law can give only uncertain and even hesitant answers. Where the claimant has failed to take reasonable care for his own safety, as by not wearing a mask provided for him, the law does its best to apportion the blame, awarding the claimant only that proportion of his damages which seems just; this apportionment is necessarily a very rough-and-ready affair.
Although we probably should have done, we have not yet reached the point at which the Courts can say that to smoke is, as a matter of law, a failure to take reasonable care for your own safety. One may imagine the public outcry which would follow a judgment to that effect where a Court, having noted the Government's 'health warning on every packet', cut a claimant's damages in half on the ground of contributory negligence by a lifetime of smoking in disregard of warnings. Such ajudgment would be soundly based in science and logic, but at present politically unacceptable.
It follows that the negligent employer may have to pay more to a claimant who is more susceptible to industrial disease because he smokes, than to one who is not. This follows the principle of law that the wrongdoer must take his victim as he finds him, with all his idiosyncratic physical weaknesses and even his follies.
In general there is an inherent bias in the Courts towards claimants, particularly when they are the victims of industrial disease as compared with accidental injury, where the claimant is often as much to blame for the occurrence as anyone. Thus the approach of the Courts to causation tends to be more humane and practical than rigorously logical. For example, where a disease occurs both industrially and within a population at large, the Courts are always ready to assume that the claimant falls into the former rather than the latter group, where there has been any significant exposure: and this although we well know that substantial numbers of similarly exposed workers suffer no ill-effect or at any rate no symptoms. This is an example of the way in which our system of law, always flexible and pragmatic rather than doctrinaire, tends to reflect current attitudes in so far as the judges are able to discern them. It is for this reason that they have not yet been prepared to find that smoking may be contributory negligence, especially in cases of pneumoconiosis, although doctrine might plainly indicate that it is. The truth is that as Mark Twain said: 'Nothing so needs reforming as other people's habits'; and of course he was an authority on giving up smoking. 'It's easy,' he said, 'I've done it thousands of times.'
There are many other variants of the problems identified so far. It is quite likely that anyone claimant may have been employed by a number of employers in the same industry, some of whose precautions may have been better than others, or each of whom may have been in breach of duty to the claimant for differing periods of time. Sometimes the total period of employment may straddle the 'date of knowledge', i.e. the date when the average careful employer ought to have known of the danger and taken precautions to eliminate it.
In the former case it will be necessary for the Court to make some sort of assessment of the respective contributions of each previous neglectful employer to the claimant's present disability and suffering. Such apportionments necessarily have to be very rough and ready: they are perhaps a little easier to do with asbestosis than with mesothelioma.
In the latter case, where there has been exposure to asbestos both before and after the date of knowledge, the Courts have been driven to speak of 'guilty dust' and 'innocent dust' attempting to distinguish between the contributions to disability of one and the other. The difficulty of doing this in any scientific way is obviously great: but as the Court of Appeal have often said, the difficulty of apportionment is not a reason for not trying. And it has to be said that the scientific approach does not always and of necessity produce the best answer. , Asbestos was once used with great freedom and little care in a thousand industrial and domestic applications. Back-street firms making insulating panels and insulating mattresses of asbestos abounded. Over the years many of these have disappeared, as the economic climate has become less favourable to small businesses. Some late developers of mesothelioma, who may be very late indeed, can easily find themselves with no one to sue. Nothing much can be done for such unfortunate people. In a few instances it may be possible to take advantage of an Act of Parliament which is not much heard of but can be very useful on occasion. This is the Third Parties (Rights Against Insurers) Act, 1930. Section 2 of this Act provides that where a company which is insured against liability to others, such as employees ('the third parties'), has incurred a liability to them and then been wound-up, the claimant can in effect sue the insurance company direct. Ofcourse it is still necessary to identify the company, even though it has ceased to trade, and to identify its insurers. Lapse of time may make this very difficult as a practical problem. But lapse of time may also raise a legal problem, the last of those to which I refer in the context of the diseases of delayed onset such as asbestosis. This is the problem known to lawyers as limitation of actions. It has for centuries been thought unjust that people should be vexed with lawsuits about events which happened long ago and in that simplified form few would disagree with the proposition. Through the centuries there have been many statutes of limitation prescribing times within which actions of various kinds must be brought. But some of these laws have produced great hardship, especially to injured workmen. To bring an action, one needs to know that one has a ground of complaint. One's house may start to subside, yet one may not know that the builder years ago fraudulently used inferior materials or methods in making the foundations. To bring a claim for negligent exposure to asbestos dust, the claimant needs to know, first ofall that he is significantly unwell, secondly that his illness is due to negligent exposure to asbestos and thirdly when and by whom he was exposed to a significantly injurious degree. These three factors may be unknown for years after the first significant exposure. There are medical questions in each of these factors. There must be first a significant illness of which the claimant could not have failed to be aware. There must be established a date when the first significant damage was done or the seeds of it implanted: and there must be advice as to whether at the date of significant exposure, the degree of it could and should have been prevented and thus that the exposure was attributable to someone's fault.
As our knowledge of insidious industrial diseases grew, it was realized that the Limitation Acts inflicted injustice on many victims. Amending Acts have now put that right, although it is still necessary for the claimant to act promptly once the knowledge of the fundamerltal facts is in his possession. It is almost certainly the examining physician who is in the best position to prompt the claimant to seek the redress to which he may be entitled.
